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LOUISE A. DRAZICH, aka
LOUISE ANN DRAZICH, as an
individual, and LOUISE A.
DRAZICH as Trustee of Trusts
created by the Will of
MARKO N. DRAZICH, deceased,

::: i
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CASE NO. 970333-CA

v.
ALAN LASSON, MARY D. WHITE,
DARRELL L. WHITE, and
DAVID A. WHITE, indivi< iua] £ ,

40Q06Qf

tL

Defendants/Appellees

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT:
. • ty ~'- bripf •'"
from the tria

refers lo the transcript ~f the proceedings

,'•

volumes and

-• refers

lo

volume one and the seconc
heai ing

refers

. :ecord u*.

LA*.- L U U U ,

and "Ex" refers t-«»

exhibit, followed by the exhibit number,
By stipulation the claims againsl
w e i e i esoJ 1 e ;:I a: i i

ti ie

II

I I H t t-Miidari,! «, in iiiih Il W'liii I

c:i a:i m against them was dismissed.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION:
This court has iurisdict~
>

--•..-.:

J--..^-

...ah v.:oue a n n o t a t e d , R u l e

o f t h e Ut -;

Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Sections 3 and 5, Article VIII wi

the Utah Constitution.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS FOR REVIEW:
ISSUE ONE
IN THE INDENTURE TO THE D.& R. G. RAILROAD, DID THE TERMS
THEREIN CONSTITUTE TERMS OF CONVEYANCE WHEREBY FEE TITLE TO
THE LAND IN QUESTION WAS CONVEYED, OR, DID THE TERMS MERELY
CONVEY A RIGHT-OF-WAY THAT WAS SUBJECT TO ABANDONMENT, WAS
ABANDONED, AND THUS NOTHING WAS EVER CONVEYED FROM THE
RAILROAD TO ITS GRANTEE AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO APPELLANT DRAZICH?
Standards for Review:
(1) A trial court's conclusions of law in civil cases are
reviewed or correctness and therefore no deference is given to the
trial court's ruling on questions of law. State v. Pena, 869 P2d
932 (Utah 1994); United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater park City
Co., 870 P2d 880 (Utah 1993).
(2) In reviewing issues of law the standard is an assessment
for correctness. State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P2d 1342 (Utah
1990).
ISSUE TWO
WERE THERE VALID AND EFFECTIVE CONVEYANCES THAT ESTABLISHED
A CHAIN OF TITLE TO DRAZICH THAT WOULD PRECLUDE PROTECTION
FOR LASSON UNDER THE MARKETABLE TITLE ACT?
Standards for Review:
See standards for issue number one above.
ISSUE THREE
DOES THE MARKETABLE TITLE ACT PROVIDE PROTECTION TO
A PARTY FROM CLAIMS EXISTING IN A PARALLEL CHAIN OF TITLE?
Standards for Review:
(1) See standards for issue number one above.
(2) In reviewing the trial court's findings, the clearly
2

erroneous standard is applied.

Bell v. Elder, 782 P2d 545 (Ut.

App. 1989)
(3) A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is without
adequate evidentiary foundation or if it is induced by an erroneous
view of the law. Cove View Excavating & Const, v. Flynn# 758 P2d
474 (Utah 1988).
(4) On appeal the appellate court must review facts in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party. Lamkin v. Lynch# 600
P2d 530 (Utah 1979).
PLEASE NOTE: In

the argument

all

issues pertaining

to

the

Marketable Title Act are argued under Point IV jointly for the sake
of brevity and clarity.
ISSUE FOUR
DID THE APPELLEE LASSON ACQUIRE TITLE TO THE DISPUTED
TRACT BY ADVERSE POSSESSION?
Standards for Review:
See standards set forth above.
ISSUE FIVE
DID THE APPELLEE LASSON ACQUIRE TITLE TO THE DISPUTED
TRACT BY VIRTUE OF THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE?
Standards for Review:
See standards set forth above.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES:
MARKETABLE TITLE ACT STATUTES
57-9-1 Utah Code Annotated SEE ADDENDUM
"What constitutes marketable record title."
57-9-2 Utah Code Annotated SEE ADDENDUM
"Rights and interests to which marketable
3

record title is subject."
57-9-3 Utah Code Annotated SEE ADDENDUM
"Marketable record title held free and
clear of interests, claims and charges."
ADVERSE POSSESSION STATUTES
78-12-7 Utah Code Annotated
SEE ADDENDUM
"Adverse possession - Possession presumed
in owner."
78-12-8 Utah Code Annotated
SEE ADDENDUM
"Under written instrument or judgment."
78-12-9 Utah Code Annotated
SEE ADDENDUM
"What constitutes adverse possession under
written instrument."
78-12-10 Utah Code Annotated SEE ADDENDUM
"Under claim not founded on written instrument
or j udgment."
78-12-11 Utah Code Annotated SEE ADDENDUM
"What constitutes adverse possession not
under written instrument."
78-12-12 Utah Code Annotated

SEE ADDENDUM

"Possession must be continuous, and taxes paid."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE:
This action involves a dispute over ownership of a parcel of
land approximately 78 feet in length and of varying width of
approximately 11 feet to 22 feet.

The area in dispute forms a

portion of the north boundary of the Drazich lands and the south
boundary of the Lasson land. The legal descriptions in their
current deeds of conveyance overlap.
The record title to the area in dispute was originally
acquired by the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company as
part of its rail system in Salt Lake County, over which a spur
4

track was maintained for many years.
On September 3, 1958, the railroad conveyed fee title to the
disputed area to Building Supply Center, and by mesne deeds of
record, title thereto has devolved to Drazich.

Lasson does not

claim or assert any conveyance from the railroad as a basis for his
title but relies upon mesne deeds which by survey and description
appear to overlap the lands conveyed to Drazich.
Issues exist over the nature of a fence line and its effect
upon the title, the uses made

of the

land by the parties,

acquiescence to boundary, the nature of the interest conveyed
initially to the railroad, methods of description in the various
deeds, and other related issues*
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS:
The case was tried without a jury before the honorable William
Bohling in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, in
September of 1996.
C. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT:
The

respective

parties

submitted

proposed

findings

and

conclusions and the court took the matter under advisement.

The

court ruled that Lasson had acquired title to the subject property
and the findings and conclusions of the defendant Lasson were
adopted by the court. & Judgment and Order, dated January 3, 1997,
was signed and entered by the court. No post-judgment motions were
made.

The judgment by the court is a final judgment for purposes

of this case and this appeal.
The defendants by the name of White were dismissed earlier in
5

the proceedings by stipulation between the parties.

parties

to this

They are not

appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. The parties Drazich and Lasson own pieces of property that
are contiguous to each other in Salt Lake County in the vicinity of
4500 South and 300 West.

(T. 15; Ex. 4-P)

2. In order to more clearly demonstrate the chains of title
for both Drazich and Lasson, the documents comprising the Drazich
chain of title are collectively compiled in chronological order in
Exhibit

15-P,

and

those

comprising

the

Lasson

chain

are

collectively compiled in Exhibit 16-P, both of which exhibits were
received by the court.

Those chains of title are outlined as

follows:
DRAZICH CHAIN:
3. Under a homestead certificate of 1875 the United States
conveyed real property that includes the disputed tract to James
Bell.

It conveyed a portion of a quarter section.
4. By indenture Bell conveyed to Helm in 1877.
5. By indenture Helm conveyed to the Denver and Rio Grande

Railroad in 1882.
6. By special warranty deed the Denver & Rio Grande conveyed
the property to Building Supply Center.
7. Building Supply then conveyed by deed to Ewell & Son; they
by deed to Ute-Liner; they by deed to D.C. Johnson; he by deed to
Michie Associations; they by deed to Homco; they by deed to First
Security Bank;

they by deed to Daw.
6

8. Daw then conveyed by Warranty Deed to Drazich in 1993.
END OF DRAZICH CHAIN
LASSON CHAIN:
9. Jenkins conveyed by warranty deed to Dahlquist in 1931.
10. Dahlquist by warranty deed in 1940 to Anderson.
11. Anderson by warranty deed to Eastman in 1948.
12. S. Eastman to G. Eastman by warranty deed in 1950.
13. G. Eastman to S. Eastman in 1951 by warranty deed.
14. S. Eastman to S. Eastman, et al. by quit claim deed in
1993.
15. S. Eastman, et al to Alan Lasson in 1993 by warranty deed.
END OF LASSON CHAIN
16. In the Lasson chain, until 1950 in the conveyance from
Stanley Eastman to Glen Eastman, all of the descriptions of the
south boundary of what is now the Lasson tract designated the
south boundary as being one rod from the center of the track.
(Ex. 16-P)
17. There was testimony by Arlen Taylor, a witness for Lasson,
that the descriptions in the deeds prior to 1950 were using metes
and bounds and not calling to the center line of the railroad. (T.
157-158) However, all deeds in the Lasson chain (Ex. 16-P) do tie
to the railroad center line until you get to the Stanley EastmanGlen Eastman deed of 1950 when it is dropped. (Ex. 8-P)
18. The witness Taylor

also testified

that the

current

description of the Lasson property is "fairly similar" to that
described in the earlier deeds. (T. 156)
7

19. In 1950, Stanley Eastman, et ux, conveyed by warranty deed
to Glen Eastman, but all reference to the railroad disappears and
for reasons that are unknown metes and bounds using measurements in
chains is substituted. (Ex. 8-P; T. 47) At this point the tie-in
to the center line of the railroad is eliminated.
20. These conflicting legal descriptions create an overlap
parcel approximately 78 feet long and varying in width from 11 to
22 feet.
21. This overlap occurred of record with the 1958 Special
Warranty Deed from the railroad to Building Supply Center. (Ex. 2P)
22. In 1910 the railroad prepared a map of their spur line,
which included the subject property. (Ex. 5-P; T. 36)
23. The area colored in yellow on the exhibit depicts the land
in the legal description included in the 1958 Special Warranty Deed
from the railroad to Building Supply Center. (T. 37)
24. Abraham Helm, by his indenture dated August 29, 1882,(Ex.
15-P) conveyed to the Denver and Rio Grand Railway Company fee
title to a strip of land which extended from the main line of the
railroad company's railroad tracks, in a northeasterly direction,
over and across the lands owned by Helm. The description contained
in the indenture describes the land to which the interest related
as being a corridor two rods in width, lying 16 1/2 feet on either
side of the center line of an existing railroad track, which area
includes the area in dispute in the instant case.

(R. 233)

25. The railroad tracks lying within the corridor were removed
8

in approximately 1904, but no precise legal description of the
location of the tracks was recorded. (R. 233) The courtfs finding
number 7 that there was confusion at some time in the past as to
the location of the tracks seems true only to a degree. There was
only one witness for Lasson who thought the track location had
shifted.

(T. Sept. 27 Trans, p. 18) No other witness for either

side came to this conclusion. This witness for Lasson did not say
where or how the track position changed.
26. Arlen Taylor also testified that the deed from the
railroad to Building Supply covers the area in dispute, that it is
described in that deed by a metes and bounds description, and that
there is a conflict between the Lasson deed and the Drazich deed.
(T. 170)
27. By stipulation the parties agreed that title to the
disputed parcel was vested in Drazich, although Lasson did not
agree that such a vesting was fee title. (T. 81-83)
28.

Arlen

Taylor

acknowledged

that

he

had

heard

the

stipulation whereby it was agreed that record title was in the
plaintiff and that he did not dispute that fact based upon the
evidence he had examined. (T. 170)
29.In 1905 the subject property was apparently dropped from
the tax rolls (T. 153), and was not taxed by the county again until
1959. (T. 153; R. 3)
30. The railroad began deeding out portions of the whole rail
corridor as early as 1926. (T. 157; R. 3)
31. At the time the deed was given from Helm to the railroad
9

the spur line had already been built, (T. 30), but the railroad
then said it needed a right-of-way 16.5 feet on each side of the
track from the center line of the track.

(T.30-31)

This was

conveyed. (T. 31)
32. In 1958 the railroad employed Coon and King Engineers to
determine the legal description of the property the railroad
intended to convey to Building Supply. (T. 33) They performed the
survey, physically staked the property, and formulated a legal
description that was used in the deed from the railroad to Building
Supply.

(T. 33)

33. In 1993 the witness Jack DeMass performed a survey of the
same land and his description, findings and configuration of the
property were exactly the same as those produced from the Coon and
King survey of 1958. (T. 33-34)
34. In researching the location of the D.& R. G. corridor and
the track, Mr. DeMass researched the railroad and County Recorder
records.

In that investigation he located a map prepared in 1910

with an affidavit attached to it.(T. 35-37)

This is Exhibit 5-P.

The affidavit was prepared by a Mr. A. Blake, who was the Division
Engineer for the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad Company. (T. 40)
However, the affidavit had been prepared in 1904. (T. 41)
35. In part, the affidavit states that Mr. Blake is ". . .
familiar with the position and location of the tracks of the Rio
Grande and Western Railway. . . ", and that he had " . . .

been

familiar with the location of said tracks for several years prior
to said date", said date being 1904.
10

(Ex. 5-P)

36. Among the railroad records pertaining to the sale of the
property to Building Supply was found a set of five sheets of
paper, the first being a copy of the 1958 deed to Building Supply,
but the last and fifth sheet being a copy of a map, dated June 11,
1958.

(Ex. 6-P; T. 43)
37. That map is different in certain respects from the 1910

map, but the lines conform with the Coon & King survey, and the map
is likewise consistent with the findings of Mr. DeMass1 prior
findings. (T. 44)
38. Based upon the Coon & King survey, the railroad issued a
Special Warranty Deed to Building Supply (Ex. 2-P), dated September
3, 1958. (R. 234) The legal description contained in the Special
Warranty Deed incorporates the parcel of land which is in dispute
in this case. (R. 234)
39. Ex. 6-P has a map which was apparently derived from the
Coon & King survey.

That map has a tie from the center line of

45th South to the northwest corner of the right-of-way.

This is

significant because it is an actual location of where the railroad
right-of-way was located. (T. 71)

The findings of fact (R. 234)

state that there was no accurate information from Coon & King
survey as to the location of the rail corridor, but it was
undisputed that Ex. 6-Pfs map was derived from Coon & King's
survey, and Mr. DeMass testified that established " . . . where the
actual location, at least according to the railroad, of where their
right-of-way was.

That's not

definitive." (T. 71)
11

something

to scale, that's a

40. Mr. DeMass further testified: "There is a specific tie
over.

Whoever prepared this railroad map tied the center line of

45th South Street and the corner of this purported
property with a bearing and a distance.

railroad

And thatfs exact.

That

can't be off."
41. Ex. 13-P is a survey done by a Mr. Page for Mr. Lasson,
the defendant.

That survey does not show a fence line along the

southern boundary, but it dos show the overlap or disputed tract.
(T. 74)
42. However, the Page survey is faulty because his distances
and calls are different from those in the Lasson deed (T. 75); and
in keeping with what Mr. DeMass concluded in his research, both
DeMass and Page found that the Lasson deed did not close, so he
[Page] apparently

" . . . chose to force a closure . . . ."(T. 75-

76)
43. Exhibit 4-P is the DeMass survey.

That survey noted the

existence of fence lines on the properties adjoining properties (T.
65), but DeMass found no evidence of a fence line running along the
back of the Green property, which is now the Lasson property. (T.
17-18)
44. The Coon & King survey (Ex. 12-D) uses fence line symbols
to show a fence line running south of what became the White, Green
(now Lasson) and United Homes properties. (T. 65)

The only

evidence that Lasson found of a fence line in the area of the
disputed tract was a strip of barbed wire and some burnt wood
remnants among other debris that he thought looked as if they could
12

have been used at one point in time as fence posts.

(T. Sept. 27

Trans, pp. 52, 63)
45. If a fence had existed at some location on the disputed
property, there was absolutely no evidence as to who erected it,
when, how long it existed, or why it was erected. Lassonrs grantor
was the only witness to testify that there had been some type of
old, decrepit fence in the bushes, but again, he was the only
witness, and his knowledge and description of the "fence" were very
sketchy at best. (T. 138)
46. Based upon the Coon & King survey the railroad issued a
Special Warranty Deed to Building Supply Center in 1958 (Ex. 2-P).
The legal description used in the deed was the one derived from the
Coon & King survey. (R. 234)
47. This Special Warranty Deed contained an exception which
reads "Subject, however, to all outstanding rights for any and all
pipe lines, fences, roads, ditches, pole and wire lines and all
other utility lines now existing upon, under, along, over or across
said described premises." (Ex. 2-P)
48. The court found that there was no "clear evidence" that
the Coon & King survey accurately reflected the historic location
of

the

railroad

tracts

travelled. (R. 234)

or the

corridor

through which

they

However there was considerable evidence by

several witnesses that indicated that a high reliability existed of
the survey being accurate as to the location of the railroad tracks
and the corridor. (T. 71-72; T. 96, 98)
49.

The

Findings

of

Fact
13

found

that

Lasson

and

his

predecessors in interest have used and occupied the disputed parcel
since at least 1950. (R. 235)

However, the evidence in fact

indicated that the area was used as a dump yard by unknown persons,
and that the area was covered with trash, weeds and other types of
debris. (T. 18)

Even Mr. Lasson testified that the property was

covered with weeds, old out-buildings, "random debris11, metal auto
parts, old trees, garden-oriented type equipment, etc. (T Sept 27
Trans, pp. 51,58,63), and that the only use Lasson made of the
property was to clear some of the weeds and junk from the property
in 1994. (T Sept 27 Trans. 63) This very limited use by Lasson is
also evidenced by some of his photographs. (Ex. 28-D, 29-D, 30-D)
50. There is some evidence from Mr. Lasson that the reason he
began to construct a fence and clear the property was that shortly
after he purchased the land he became aware that Mr. Drazich laid
claim to the disputed tract of property. (T. Sept. 27 Trans, p. 72)
51. Mr. Lasson testified that he has paid taxes on the
property deeded to him since the date of his conveyance. (T. Sept.
27 Trans, p. 68)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I:
THE WORDS OF CONVEYANCE FROM HELM TO THE RAILROAD IN 1882
DID NOT CONVEY A MERE RIGHT-OF-WAY BUT RATHER, CONVEYED
FEE SIMPLE TITLE.
The district court concluded that the words used in the
conveyance from Helm to the railroad conveyed merely a right-of-way
that was

subject

to abandonment

and

abandoned by the railroad. (R. 235-236)
14

was in

fact

thereafter

However, the words used in the indenture clearly convey fee
title to the railroad, and not a right-of-way.
POINT II:
THE DEFENDANT LASSON DID NOT ACQUIRE TITLE TO THE DISPUTED
PARCEL BY ADVERSE POSSESSION.
While the conclusions of law do not specifically address this
issue, the comments of the court during the trial and the findings
of fact indicate that the court relied upon adverse possession in
determining that Lasson had acquired title to the property by that
means. However, the fundamental requirements of acquiring title by
adverse possession have not been met by Lasson or his predecessors
in interest.

POINT III:
THE DEFENDANT LASSON DID NOT ACQUIRE TITLE TO THE DISPUTED
TRACT OF LAND BASED UPON THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY
ACQUIESCENCE.
As with the adverse possession claim, no specific conclusion
of law refers to this theory, but title is awarded based upon this
legal concept considering again the findings made by the court and
the comments of the court at trial.

The appellate courts have

established four fundamental requirements to establish boundary by
acquiescence and the defendant Lasson has failed to meet any those
requirements.

15

THE DEFENDANT LASSON UNDER TERMS AND REQUIREMENTS
OF THE MARKETABLE TITLE ACT, NOR DOES THE MARKETABLE TITLE
APPLY TO THIS FACTUAL SCENARIO.
Mr. Lasson asserts that the Marketable Title Act deprives Mr.
Drazich of title to the disputed tract, and quiets title to the
property

in

him.

However,

this

is

a

misapplication

and

misinterpretation of the Marketable Title Act. It does not work to
aid in quieting title in Lasson, nor does it apply to the factual
scenario of this case.
Furthermore, the Marketable Title Act does not protect a party
from claims in a parallel chain of title.

Thus, the Marketable

Title Act cannot provide Lasson clear title to the property against
the claims of Drazich.

ARGUMENT
POINT I:
THE WORDS OF CONVEYANCE USED IN THE INDENTURE FROM HELM
TO THE RAILROAD DID NOT CONVEY A MERE RIGHT-OF-WAY SUBJECT
TO ABANDONMENT, BUT RATHER, CONVEYED FEE SIMPLE TITLE.
Lasson has relied heavily on the words of conveyance in the
indenture from Helm to the railroad to substantiate his point that
these words were merely a grant of a right-of-way which was subject
to abandonment, and not a grant in fee. This argument was adopted
by the district court in its second and third conclusions of law
(R. 235-236), and is the underpinning for most of the Lasson claims
16

to the property.

The result of this conclusion by the court is

that the railroad was unable to convey fee title to its successors
in interest.
The operative language in the indenture (Ex. 15-P) reads in
relevant part ". . . hereby grants, bargains, sells and conveys to
the party of the second part, its successors and assigns forever in
fee, all that land and Real [sic] estate . . . ." It is well known
that the phrase "Grant, bargain, sell and convey" has long been
recognized to convey fee title.

In fact, this phraseology has

historically been the language of choice in countless conveyances.
The use of the word "Grant" was long ago ruled as being
equivalent to a deed in fee in the case of United States v.
Northern Pacific Railroad Co.f 12 P. 769, 770, 6 Mont. 351.

The

conveyance language in our case uses as well the word "fee".
Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., states that "Grant" has become a
generic term applicable to all transfers of real property, and
cites many supporting cases and authorities thereunder in support
of its position.
In Love v. Missouri Union Presbytery, 534 SW2d 511 at 514 (Mo.
App), the Missouri court states that the ". . . words grant,
bargain and sell within a deed import the vesting of fee simple
title."
In Bender v. Fromberger, 4 U.S. 436 at 440, the United States
Supreme Court held that the phrase
conveys fee title.

"Grant, Bargain and Sell"

See also Rianda v. Watsonville Water & Light

Co., 93 P 79, 81 (Cal. 1907)

The court will note the age of many
17

of these cases.

This is indicative of the fact that the phrase

"Grant, Bargain, Sell and Convey" has long been established as a
valid, operative phrase to convey fee title in land, and was in all
likelihood the choice at the time the conveyance was made by Helm
to the railroad.
The district court refers to there "being imprecise legal
description and other relevant language" (R. 235) as a basis for
concluding there was a right-of-way.

To clarify this rather

ambiguous conclusion, which is not supported by proper findings,
there arose during argument and witness examination much was made
of the issue that warranties were absent from the indenture and
therefore, absent warranties no valid conveyance was made. Also,
the district court in its conclusions at R. 236, concluded that
"Based upon the abandonment and the conditional language contained
in the 1958 Special Warranty Deed from the Railroad Company to
Building Supply Center regarding warranty and fence lines, no
conveyance of the disputed strip of land actually occurred.

We

have dealt with the abandonment issue, but we wish to briefly
address this point concerning warranty and fence language in the
1958 deed.
First, we submit that warranties are separate and apart from
the conveyance itself and have nothing to do with the actual
conveyance of the property. How the limited warranties in a Special
Warranty Deed vitiates a title transfer is in no way explained by
the district court and certainly is not supported by law or the
facts.

We refer the court to 26 CJS Deeds, Sec. 22 (e) at 628,
18
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exception such as

1 I if

foregoing in a deed is common, is done for the protection of the
grantor, and does not constitute an admission that any of the named
exceptions actually exists. (T. 91; T. 160)
POINT II;
THE DEFENDANT LASSON DID NOT ACQUIRE TITLE TO THE DISPUTED
PARCEL OF LAND BY ADVERSE POSSESSION.
Adverse possession

is a means of establishing

possession to land that is owned by another.

title and

It is just what it

says it is, a possession and claim that is adverse to the rights of
the true owner. If the person taking possession does so under some
type of deed or other conveyance, this is termed taking under
"color of

title", although our

courts

have often not

substantial effect to possession under color of title.

given

Since the

defendant Lasson claims title to the disputed strip of land under
a deed, it is necessary to discuss the ramifications of color of
title on the defendant's claim.
78-12-9 U.C.A. provides as follows:
"For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by any
person claiming a title founded upon a written instrument or
a judgment or decree, land is deemed to have been possessed
and occupied in the following cases:
(1) Where it has been usually cultivated or improved.
(2) Where it has been protected by a substantial
inclosure.
(3) Where, although not inclosed, it has been used
for the supply of fuel, or fencing timber, for the
purpose of husbandry, or for pasturage or for
the ordinary use of the occupant.
(4) Where a known farm or single lot has been partly
improved, the portion of such farm or lot that may
have been left not cleared or not inclosed
according to the usual course and custom of the
adjoining county is deemed to have ben occupied for
the same length of time as the part improved
and cultivated."
20

Vi:+.
use,

jpen and notorious

our Supreme Court has made it clear over the years thar trns
;

requirement pertains equaJ
thai, cui""'

'

.-1 iii>FI where

-.. ...

code section

i

>

claimed under coici ,.,; t.i

The case of Day v. Steele, 184 P2d 218 (Utah 1947), at 220, made
this clear when the court was confronted with
adverse claimant purchased the land at a tax sa.e a,iu iidu
a defective deed

an^r-.-

During the next ten years he p«id the tax*--

surveyed the land and established mark*

rip^r^H Si

i

a water meter, replaced corner posts, and filled excavations.
unanimous court said
VlSaxrO
11 Civ
ti

'

-

1

ve are of the opinion that respondents
I 1
II in 1.

i i '
1 mi

- t tiv.
. * *•
-

"f1!"I a c
viiin 1. c:i

'i
J,

11 in I
J in, i

! r i n
M K
1 i i n II, I'll i cui f

"il i
• II
j 1/ I'IOI n

I! I
i mi II— j ,

ff

open, notorious ond exclusive

In the instant action the use made

property by the

d e f *-r:<"i •*' '

some trdx

and weeds, and taken some stept

fencing of the property.
defer,/'i-r

« ..-. i part

Furthermore, the court s finding that tb >
^ . >.-.

activities that constituted opei . continuous and notorious
•the property adverse
w i I I i i HI 1!

>r 1 he true owner

* •ota' *

1 »ii

found a I - ' existed,

w» submit

that

>

the "fence"

constituted a "substantial inclosure" as required by law.
"'"::1

"

:

" I

II

<•• ffeho' i:. idcL did exist.

I llii|

I

The extent

""

'

ii"! | | | . i n

(

|

n

We also
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imii

i the fence found is th-.t

Lasson alone said he found a strip oi barbed wire and among the
*1

trash some unspecified number of burned pieces of wood that he
interpreted to be fence posts. Their location was

not specified.

[One of Lasson's witnesses testified that there had been some old
sheds burned in fire in the same area and these so called fence
posts could just as well have been remnants from the burned sheds.
(T. 137)] This is critical since Lasson!s testimony of fence
evidence is not tied in to the physical location of the fence
markings on the Coon & King survey.

Other evidence of the

existence of a fence available to the court was the fence line
marking on the Coon & King survey.

But that marking indication

fails to state the type of fence, how long it had existed, who
erected it, or why it was created. In point of fact, there is very
little credible evidence that a fence of any type ever existed
across the disputed tract, and certainly no evidence as to its
history if it did exist.
For argument's sake, even if we assume a fence existed, this
alone would not satisfy the "substantial inclosure" requirement of
the law. We refer the court to the case of Peterson v. Johnson, 34
P2d 697, at 698 (Utah, 1934) where the court stated that:
"The mere fact that the defendant's predecessors in title
inclosed within his fence a strip of land not covered by
his deed and that such fence has ben maintained for a long
period of time does not vest title in such land in the
defendant."
In the case of Scott v. Hansen, 442 P2d 525 (Utah, 1966). our
Supreme Court held that:
"When land is held under color of title the possessory
requirement for adverse possession may extend to the
land described in the document providing the color
of title, but only if the tract of land is an integrated
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in

which defendant was entitled-

There was also evidence that there

may have been some burnt posts and possibly some wire fastened to
the posts along the south end of the property.

The court found

that the fence was never intended to be a boundary nor was it
recognized as such.

However, the most telling facts concern the

uses made of the strip of land by the adverse claimant.
On the disputed strip in that case the claiming party had
deposited old vehicles and trash, and as the court observed, " . .
the defendant used not only the disputed strip, but also, and of
necessity, so used additional, open, uninclosed and unoccupied
ground

to

the

south

of

the

strip, which

additional

ground

confessedly belonged to the plaintiff, and admittedly was not
acquired adversely or otherwise by the defendant." (Ibid., at p.
66) (We submit that these facts are substantially identical to
those of the case before this court.)

In finding that such a use

was inadequate the Supreme Court stated and ruled as follows:
"It is not uncommon for one neighbor to let vehicles stand on
uninclosed and unoccupied ground of another, to lead or
drive horses over it, and to throw manure and rubbish
on it. All that may be a trespass or a nuisance; but it
hardly is such a possession or occupancy as is calculated to
give the owner notice of an adverse holding, and knowledge to
him that, if he does not take steps to interrupt the
occupancy, it will ripen into a title by limitation. * * *
Hence the general rule that the possession of an adverse
claimant must be continuous, exclusive, open, hostile,
notorious, and of such character as to enable the owner
to know of the invasion of his rights. I do not think the
defendant's possession or occupancy or use of the strip
was of that character." (Ibid., at 66) [Emphasis added]
The absolute necessity of the adverse party conducting his
occupancy in such a way that it gives notice to the true owner
cannot be understated. The court in Scott, supra., at 529, stated
24

t

:
"If the rule were otherwise, landowners would
be placed under the unduly burdensome necessity of
periodically checking the property descriptions
of their neighbors to see that some document had not
been placed of record which encroached upon their
land."
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that one of the purposes of the statute requiring payment
of taxes in order to establish adverse possession is that
by paying taxes on the land a public record is made
which gives notice to the owner that his land is being
claimed adversely. This purpose cannot be fulfilled
if the possessor can wait any number of years, even
up to the necessary seven, and then pay the taxes in a
lump sum by redeeming."
The facts show that Lasson did not acquire the property until
1993, short of the seven years, and no evidence was produced as to
what taxes may have been levied by the county and paid by his
predecessors in interest prior to his 1993 deed. Clearly, then, he
fails as to both the possession and tax requirements imposed by law
as necessary elements to establish title by adverse possession.
POINT III:
THE DEFENDANT LASSON FAILED TO ESTABLISH TITLE BY THE
DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE.
While it is not entirely clear what role adverse possession or
boundary by acquiescence played in the court's final ruling, it
appears from the nature of some of the conclusions, as well as the
factual emphasis on various subjects such as nature of occupation,
continuity of use, the payment of taxes, fence lines, types of use,
visible markers, periods of occupation, and other such topics that
these legal principles did form a substantial basis for the court's
final ruling.
The elements that our appellate courts have established as the
basis for resolving title through boundary by acquiescence are set
forth in a variety of Utah cases, and we cite to the court as an
example the case of Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P2d 417 (Utah 1990),
wherein the components listed are: "(1) Occupation up to a visible
26
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(2)

mutual

acquiescence in the line as a boundary/ (3) for a long period of
I : •. !:1: le Staker:

time,. ( 4) I: s adjoinii ig 1 andowners " (Emphasis added)
case the occupation line w a s a readily

isible and permanent fence

line witl I the occupation itself consisting c:f h o u s e s , buildings,
cm iJ I:::! vate<
In Goodman v. Wilkinson/ 629 P2d 447,

-
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court ruled that "failure to establish any one of the four elements
is fatal to the defense of" boundar ^ b y acquiescence " ' (I'^iphas ' •
added)
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the meaning 'f rb<* -econd

line. -jr. numerous occasions.
In the case - r Madson v. Cleqq,

639 P2d 726 (Utah 1981), the

"This Court has determined that Iii the absence
of an express agreement as to the location of the
boundary between adjoining owners, the law will
imply an agreement fixing the boundary as located,
if it can do so consistently with the facts appearing.
However, when the evidence fails to support any
implication that a fence has been erected by
adjoining owners pursuant to an agreement between
them as to the location of the boundary, the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has no application."
r, +^n
Utah Suprem

~r.^n i-\* Glen v. Whitney, 2u^ P2d ' •
-v

11

there must be some uncertainty or a dispute
between adjoining owners as to the location of the
true boundary line before a fence which they
subsequently erect to resolve their differences
and in which they acquiesce for a long period of time,
may be taken as the agreed boundary line."
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In all cases examined and cited herein, or otherwise available
on this point, the appellate courts of this state require a
substantial and highly visible marker to establish the line of
demarcation between the parties.

At best, the defendants have

shown that a couple of burned posts in a rubbish pile, and a strand
or two of wire were present. Under the fact situations of no case
examined for this action have we found a boundary "marker" of this
dignity in which a court would declare the parties have acquiesced.
Furthermore, the dispute in the case over the location of the
track line does not appear to support Lasson.
witness who testified

He had but one

that he thought the track position had

changed, but was not at all clear as to when, where or how. On the
other hand, the 1910 affidavit from the railroad Engineer is much
closer

in

time,

observation.

and

is

based

upon

personal

knowledge

and

He, Mr. Blake, was quite certain as to the location

of the track and the Drazich chain is based largely upon his
knowledge.

Other witnesses were likewise quite certain as to the

location of the track.
It is important that there first of all be an adequate
boundary marker. Unless this is present it is virtually impossible
for he court to determine that the parties have acquiesced in a
boundary to that marker.

In Florence v. Hiline Equipment Co., 581

P2d 998 (Utah 1978), the court ruled that the parties must, by
evidence, acquiesce that the fence is the boundary. In our case we
have very minimal evidence of what might have been a fence, no
evidence that any parties were aware of the fence, very little
28
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marked definitely oy m o n u m e n t s , fences or b u i l d i n g s ,
should be noted that this case emphasized the necessity o^ having
i i' ::: I: c i iJ ] a 3 e f 3 i: id te iiaj : ke:i : bi i !::: occupatioi
,: Fuoco v. W i l l i a m s , 421 P2d 944 (Utah 1 9 6 6 ) , at ^4t\, <
Supreme Court ruled t h a t :
"A claimed b o i m c j a r y line by a C q U i e s c e n c e m u s t be
open to observation. * * *
A boundary line to
b e established by acquiescence m u s t b e d e f i n i t e ,
certain and not speculative." (Emphasis added)
We submit that i n that case at bar we .have only a speculative
boundary line,
char ac ter

a i:

speculative even
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chain of title ever knew ..:

the terue c

*' existence or p h v s i r a i
whether anyone

he

m u t u a l l y recognized it

is

a boundary between the twc parcels of land for

the requisite

year period c: f t. i m e .
The fact situation in Fuoco is instructive on this p o i n t .
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In

that case there was a ditch used only for one tract for irrigation,
it was in a disintegrating nature and frequently obscured by weeds.
The court found the ditch did not rise to the dignity of a boundary
marker under the law.

The court noted that any number of ditches

could cross a person's land for purposes other than a boundary
marker.

The same can be said for fences.

Even with a finding of

the existence of a fence, there is no evidence to support a finding
that the fence constituted a mutually agreed upon boundary between
the two tracts of land.
One of the most

recent

cases

is that

of Van

Dyke v.

Chappell,818 P2d 1023 (Utah 1991), wherein the court ruled that
there must be substantial use and mutual agreement to a definite
and obvious point.

The court made three important rulings.

The

substantial use, the mutual agreement and the existence of a
definite and obvious point of boundary.

The evidence in our case

would seem to provide little support for any of the three elements
required by the court in that case.
We could cite many cases defining occupancy or use.
Dyke case cited above requires substantial use.
action we have virtually no use.

The Van

In the instant

The testimony is that the area

was used by the neighborhood, including some of the defendants, as
a garbage dump, and one key witness for the defense testified that
the trash was dumped beyond the alleged fence line. (T. 142)
The need to make substantial use to a given point is critical
so as to give notice to all parties concerned of the physical point
to which a party claims title.

Furthermore, we question whether
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courts. We submit that iz does not, even if the trash being dumped
was by the defendants alone and not bv

thers in the neighborhood.

In defining occupancy, the court -. urangstreet v. Auto-Owners
Ins.

: .31 (Wise ) , I: .eld

Co., 536 NW :i 8-

that:

"Occupancy means LU Lake up residence in . . . , to reside
in as owner or tenant; to take or enter upon possession
of;
to hold possession of; to hold or keep for use; to
possess; to tenant; to do business in; to take or
hold possession. Actual use, possession and cultivation."
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The court held as follows:

"The mere fact that the defendants predecessors
in title inclosed within his fence a strip of land
not covered by his deed and that such fence had
been maintained for a long period of time does
not vest title in, such land in the defendant "
After considerable wrangling by the parties, this cou rt
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been established, and the failure of any one is fatal to the claim
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POINT

IV:

THE MARKETABLE TITLE ACT DOES NOT ACT TO DIVEST THE
PLAINTIFF DRAZICH OF HIS PROPERTY, NOR DOES IT ACT TO QUIET
J JL

TITLE TO THE DISPUTED TRACT IN THE NAME OF THE DEFENDANT
LASSON.
The "Marketable Title Act" is set forth in 57-9-1, et. seq.,
U.C.A., a complete copy of which is included in the addendum to
this brief.

The defendant Lasson and the district court placed

considerable emphasis on this statute to support the award and
judgment to Lasson.

In Lassonfs trial brief

(R. 112) the

arguments made by him condense down essentially to a claim that
they have a 40 year chain of title which is supposedly unbroken and
therefore Lasson is entitled to have title quieted in his name.
The defendant Lasson seems to confuse the issues of adverse
possession with the Marketable Title Act. The Marketable Title Act
has nothing to do with adverse possession, but is instead a means
used to perfect title against claims that arose prior to the root
of title, as that root is established by the statute. To prevail
the title holder must have an unbroken record chain of title for at
least 40 ears plus such period of time as may be necessary to find
the next fee simple conveyance.

You may then ignore any claims

behind that root but you are charged with notice of any conveyance
since the root.
For Lasson to benefit from the Marketable Title Act he must
show an unbroken record chain, as well as nothing that purports to
divest any interest in his chain.

In this case we have two

independent chains of title that on their face would appear to be
marketable.
The facts are clear that the railroad owned fee title to the
subject tract, and not a mere right-of-way.
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Thus, fee title was
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Company. T h e M a r k e t a b l e Title Act list' five (r ) exceptions to the
a c t , number four
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stales 111

.

to our case.

sub j ect to:

it

. .

"Any interest arising out of a til ,le transaction which has
been recorded subsequent to the effective date of the root
of title from which the unbroken chain of title of record is
started; provided, however, that such recording shall not
revive or give validity to any interest which has been
extinguished prior to the time of the recording by the
operation of Section S7-9-*
The
to tl le defendant's xouL ol title.

(See Exhibits 15-P and 16- r

From that date we have a number of conveyances, witri the plaintiffs
beii .
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conveyances
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ransacti on,.

recorded w i t h i n forty years alter t h e recording of the root nf
title even though such instrument pi.s outside t h e record chain ul_
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a

title," (Emphasis added)
The "Title Standards of the Utah State Bar" concerning the
Marketable Title Act are instructive and helpful on these issues.
Standard No. 45 states that "The Marketable Title Act is remedial
in character and should be relied upon as a cure or remedy for such
imperfections of title as fall within its scope."

The effect of

the act is limited and clearly the facts of this case do not fall
within its scope.
Even more in point is standard No. 54, which states that:
"The recording of an instrument of conveyance subsequent to
the effective date of the root of title has the same effect
in preserving any interest conveyed as the filing of the
notice provided for in Sec. 4 of the ct. See Utah Code Ann.
57-9-2(4) (1953). (Emphasis added)
The comment provides additional clarification.

In part, it

states at the outset that "This standard is operative both where
there are claims under a single chain of title and where there are
two or more independent chains of title."

(Emphasis added)

We therefore submit that with the many conveyances of record
since Lasson's root of title, coupled with the fee ownership of the
railroad, the Marketable Title Act simply avails neither party
anything.

If Lasson can claim that it cures the defects in his

chain, then Drazich can make the same claim as to his chain, both
of which are independent of the other.
One final question remains, for which we have been unable to
find any answer or any supporting authority in either direction.
If

the

overlap

has

been

caused

because

of

the

change

in

descriptions made in the 1950 deed from Stanley Eastman to Glen
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tap1"

aoroken chain, ana, does it give

him a i >aa

*.

'

tie requisite period under the Marketable

Title Act?

These questions presently have i IC a 1:1s / HE i •
CONCLUSION

We have attempted to marshal1 the evidence that the court had
available *
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showing

that title by adverse possession was acquired by Lasson rests upon
him.

The facts do nor support his contention.

paymen

s a an year s,

There is no shown ng

and whether we ] ook at tl le

case from the perspective of simple adverse possession
possession under color of title, we cannot find fat III".
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adverse
a

holding that Lasson acquired title by adverse possession.
As to boundary by acquiescence, again the burden of proof lies
upon Lasson.

Even at best, he had only one witness who testified

of seeing an old fence of some sort in the brush. No one else saw
this fence.

Only Lasson found a strand or two of wire, and some

burned posts amongst rubbish that he said "could" have been fence
posts.

But does this constitute a substantial inclosure for the

purposes of adverse possession, or, a clear line to which parties
mutually acquiesce for purposes of boundary by acquiescence?

We

cannot say that it does for either purpose. Indeed, in viewing the
court decisions extant on these legal principles, we can only
conclude that the whole fence line issue has been greatly blown out
of proportion and that the so called "fence" does not in any way
meet the criteria to satisfy the legal requirements under either
legal doctrine.
The uses made of the property furnish even less support for
the Lasson position than the fence. The property was a waste dump
for years, if not decades. Clearly, Lassonfs claims of substantial
uses of the property do not square with any facts presented to the
court.
Finally, the Marketable Title Act.

Here we have Lasson

attempting to bootstrap himself into title due to his predecessors'
changing of the method they described the property they had granted
to them.

When Stanley Eastman granted to Grant Eastman the

evidence was uncontroverted that it was due to the change of
description in that

conveyance that
36

the overlap of

the two

properties occurred.

Say what anyone might, the

railroad's

position and property description had long been established, and in
the Lasson chain of title the call had always been to the center
line of the tracks. Suddenly we have a completely different change
of description with the admitted result the legal descriptions of
the properties then overlapped. Lassonfs witness Arlen Taylor said
that the descriptions before and after were "fairly similar." This
cannot suffice.

One can only convey what one owns and "fairly

similar" descriptions of land cannot be used as a legitimate basis
to claim title to land.
The Marketable Title Act does not afford protection in such a
situation, nor does it provide relief to people in a parallel chain
of title, jif the Lasson chain can really even be called parallel
due the different descriptions used.

Thus, this act affording no

protection Lasson must prevail on one of the others points, and
there being no supportable law or facts there his claims to the
property in dispute, we submit, must be denied and the decision of
the district court should be reversed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /cS

801-521-8220
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^dav of September, 1997.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing Appellant's Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to David
P. Hirschi, attorney for appellee Lasson, 2224 North 640 West, West
Bountiful, Utah, 84087, on the j / / ^ / 7 ! day of September, 1997.
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ADDENDUM
STATUTES: (All references to Utah Code Annotated)
57-9-1
57-9-2
57-9-3
78-2a-3
78-12-7
78-12-8
78-12-9
78-12-10
78-12-11
78-12-12

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER

57-8-35

REAL ESTATE

declaration and bylaws adopted p u r s u a n t to the provisions of
this act.
(2) All agreements, decisions and determinations lawfully
made by the manager, management committee or by the
association of unit owners in accordance with this act, the
declaration or bylaws, shall be deemed to be binding on all
unit owners.
1963
57-8-35.

Effect of o t h e r l a w s — C o m p l i a n c e w i t h ordin a n c e s a n d c o d e s — Approval of projects b y
m u n i c i p a l i t y or county.
(1) The provisions of this chapter shall be in addition and
supplemental to all other provisions of law, statutory or
judicially declared, provided t h a t wherever the application of
the provisions of this chapter conflict with the application of
such other provisions, this chapter shall prevail: provided
further, for purposes of Sections 10-9-805, 10-9-811, and
17-27-804 and provisions of similar import and any law or
ordinance adopted p u r s u a n t thereto, a condominium project
shall be considered to be a subdivision, and a record of survey
m a p or supplement thereto prepared p u r s u a n t to this chapter
shall be considered to be a subdivision m a p or plat, only with
respect to:
(a) such real property or improvements, if any, as are
intended to be dedicated to the use of the public in
connection with the creation of the condominium project
or portion thereof concerned; and
(b) those units, if any, included in the condominium
project or portion thereof concerned which are not contained in existing or proposed buildings.
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be interpreted to state or
imply t h a t a condominium project, unit, association or unit
owners, or management committee is exempt by this chapter
from compliance with the zoning ordinance, building and
sanitary codes, and similar development regulations which
have been adopted by a municipality or county. No condominium project or any use within said project or any unit or
parcel or parcel of land indicated as a separate unit or any
structure within said project shall be permitted which is not in
compliance with said ordinances and codes.
(3) From and after the time a municipality or county shall
have established a planning commission, no condominium
project or any record of survey map, declaration, or other
material as required for recordation under this chapter shall
be recorded in the office of the county recorder unless and until
the following mentioned attributes of said condominium
project shall have been approved by the municipality or
county in which it is located. In order to more fully avail itself
of this power, the legislative body of a municipality or county
may provide by ordinance for the approval of condominium
projects proposed within its limits. This ordinance may include and shall be limited to a procedure for approval of
condominium projects, the standards and the criteria for the
geographical layout of a condominium project, facilities for
utility lines and roads which shall be constructed, the percentage of the project which must be devoted to common or
recreational use, and the content of the declaration with
respect to the standards which must be adhered to concerning
maintenance, upkeep, and operation of any roads, utility
facilities, recreational areas, and open spaces included in the
project.
(4) Any ordinance adopted by the legislative body of a
municipality or county which outlines the procedures for
approval of a condominium project shall provide for:
(a) a preliminary approval, which, among other things,
will then authorize the developer of the condominium
project to proceed with the project; and
(b) a final approval which will certify t h a t all of the
requirements set forth in the preliminary approval either
have been accomplished or have been assured of accom-

plishment by bond or other appropriate means. No (
ration or record of survey map shall be recorded i
office of the county recorder until a final approva
been granted.
57-8-36.

E x i s t i n g p r o j e c t s — Effect of statutory am
ments.
Any condominium project established by instruments
for record prior to the effective date of the foregoing an
ments to the Condominium Ownership Act (hereinaftc
ferred to as an "existing project") and the rights and ol
tions of all parties interested in any such existing pj
shall, to the extent that the declaration, bylaws, and reo
survey map concerning the existing project are inconsi
with the provisions of these amendments, be governec
controlled by the provisions of the Condominium Owne
Act as they existed prior to these amendments and b
terms of the existing project's declaration, bylaws, and r
of survey map to the extent t h a t these terms are cons'
with applicable law other t h a n these amendments. Any
ing project containing or purporting to contain time j
units, convertible land, or convertible space, any ex
project which is or purports to be a contractible, expam
or leasehold condominium, the validity of any such pi
and the validity and enforceability of any provisions cor
ing time period units, convertible land, convertible swithdrawable land, additional land, or leased land whic
set forth in an existing project's declaration, bylaws, or i
of survey map, shall be governed by applicable law in
prior to these amendments, including principles relati
reasonableness, certainty, and constructive and actual r
shall not necessarily be ineffective or defeated in whole
part because the project or provision in question doe
comply or substantially comply with those requirements
foregoing amendments which would have been applicabl
the instruments creating the project been recorded aft<
effective date of these amendments, but shall, in any eve
valid, effective, and enforceable if the project or provis
question either substantially complies with those re
ments of the foregoing amendments which relate t
subject at issue or employs an arrangement which sul
tially achieves the same policy as underlies those re
ments of the foregoing amendments which relate t
subject at issue.
CHAPTER 9
MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE
Section
57-9-1.
57-9-2.
57-9-3.
57-9-4.
57-9-5.
57-9-6.
57-9-7.
57-9-8.
57-9-9.
57-9-10.

What constitutes marketable record title.
Rights and interests to which marketable i
title is subject.
Marketable record title held free and cl<
interests, claims, and charges.
Filing of notice of claim of interest authori.
Effect of possession of land by record ow
possessory interest.
Notice of claim of interest — Contents —
for record.
Applicability of provisions.
Existing statutes of limitations and rec<
statutes not affected.
Definitions.
Legislative purpose and construction.
Extension of limitation period.

57-9-1. What c o n s t i t u t e s m a r k e t a b l e r e c o r d title
Any person having the legal capacity to own land i
state, who has an unbroken chain of title of record i

•m

REAL ESTATE

•*«• rest in land for forty years or more, shall be deemed to
^ T g marketable record title to such interest as defined in
ijfvjon 57.9-8, subject only to the matters stated in Section
ffo-2. A person shall be deemed to have such an unbroken
jTin of ^ e w n e n ^ n e official public records disclose a
frtycyance or other title transaction, of record not less than
? J L years at the time the marketability is to be determined,
hich said conveyance or other title transaction purports to
--ate such interest, either in
^ ^ (1) the person claiming such interest or
(2) some other person from whom, by one or more
conveyances or other title transactions of record, such
purported interest has become vested in the person claiming such interest: with nothing appearing of record, in
either case, purporting to divest such claimant of such
purported interest.
1963
57 9-2. R i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s to w h i c h marketable
*
record title is subject.
The marketable record title is subject to:
(1) all interests and defects which are inherent in the
muniments of which such chain of record title is formed,
except that a general reference in the muniments or any
of them, to easements, use restrictions, or other interests
created prior to the root of title is not sufficient to preserve
them, unless specific identification is made therein of a
recorded title transaction which creates the easement,
use restriction, or other interest;
(2) all interests preserved by the filing of proper notice
or by possession by the same owner continuously for a
period of 40 years or more, in accordance with Section
57-9-4;
(3) the rights of any person arising from prescriptive
use or a period of adverse possession or user, which was in
whole or in part subsequent to the effective date of the
root of title;
(4) any interest arising out of a title transaction which
has been recorded subsequent to the effective date of the
root of title from which the unbroken chain of title of
record is started, except that the recording does not revive
or give validity to any interest which has been extinguished prior to the time of the recording by the operation
of Section 57-9-3; and
(5) the exceptions stated in Section 57-9-6 as to rights
of reversioners in leases, as to apparent easements and
interests in the nature of easements, as to the right, title,
or interests of the state in school or institutional trust
lands, and as to interests of the United States.
1995
57-9-3. M a r k e t a b l e r e c o r d title h e l d free a n d c l e a r of
interests, claims, and charges.
Subject to Sections 57-9-2 and 57-9-6:
(1) the marketable record title shall be held by its
owner and shall be taken by any person dealing with the
land free and clear of all interests, claims, or charges,
whatsoever, the existence of which depends upon any act,
transaction, event, or omission that occurred prior to the
effective date of the root of title; and
(2) all such interests, claims, or charges, however denominated, whether legal or equitable, present or future,
whether the interests, claims, or charges are asserted by
a person sui juris or under a disability, whether the
person is within or without the state, whether the person
is natural or corporate, or is private or governmental, are
declared to be void.
1995
57-9-4. F i l i n g of n o t i c e of claim of i n t e r e s t authorized
— Effect of p o s s e s s i o n of land by r e c o r d
owner of possessory interest.
(1) Any person claiming an interest in land may preserve
*nd keep effective such interest by filing for record during the

57-9-6

forty-year period immediately following the effective date of
the root of title of the person whose record title would
otherwise be marketable, a notice in writing, duly verified by
oath, setting forth the nature of the claim. No disability or lack
of knowledge of any kind on the part of anyone shall suspend
the running of the forty-year period. The notice may be filed
for record by the claimant or by any other person acting in
behalf of any claimant who is
(a) under a disability,
(b) unable to assert a claim on his own behalf, or
(c) one of a class, but whose identity cannot be established or is uncertain at the time of filing the notice of
claim for record.
(2) If the same record owner of any possessory interest in
land has been in possession of such land continuously for a
period of forty years or more, during which period no title
transaction with respect to such interest appears of record in
his chain of title, and no notice has been filed by him or on his
behalf as provided in Subsection (1), and such possession
continues to the time when marketability is being determined,
such period of possession shall be deemed equivalent to the
filing of the notice immediately preceding the termination of
the forty-year period described in Subsection (1).
1963
57-9-5. Notice of claim of interest — Contents — Filing
for record.
Tb be effective and to be entitled to record, the notice
referred to above shall contain an accurate and full description
of all land affected by such notice which description shall be
set forth in particular terms and not by general inclusions; but
if the claim is founded upon a recorded instrument, then the
description in the notice may be the same as that contained in
the recorded instrument. The notice shall be filed for record in
the registry of deeds of the county or counties where the land
described therein is situated. The recorder of each county shall
accept all such notices presented to him which describe land
located in the county in which he serves and shall enter and
record full copies thereof in the same way that deeds and other
instruments are recorded and each recorder shall be entitled
to charge the same fees for the recording thereof as are
charged for recording deeds. In indexing the notices in his
office each recorder shall enter the notices under t h e grantee
indexes of deeds under the names of the claimants appearing
in the notices. Such notices shall also be indexed under the
description of the real estate involved in a book set apart for
that purpose to be known as the "Notice Index.*
1963
57-9-6. Applicability of p r o v i s i o n s .
This act may not be applied to bar:
(1) any lessor or his successor as a reversioner of his
right to possession on the expiration of any lease; or
(2) extinguish any easement or interest in the nature of
an easement created or held for any pipeline, highway,
railroad or public utility purpose, or any easement or
interest in the nature of an easement, the existence of
which is clearly observable by physical evidence of its use;
or
(3) extinguish any water rights, whether evidenced by
decrees, by certificates of appropriation, by diligence
claims to the use of surface or underground water or by
water users* claims filed in general determination proceedings; or
(4) extinguish any right, title, estate, or interest in and
to minerals, and any development, mining, production or
other rights or easements related to the minerals or
exercisable in connection with the minerals; or
(5) any right, title, or interest of the state in school or
institutional trust lands; or
(6) any right, title, or interest of the United States, by
reason of failure to file the notice herein required.
1995
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^^w-presiding judge may be removed from the office of
1^5?judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of
*- *j£ addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of
# k , t h e presiding judge shall:
#*/?) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels;
1
/u) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
J v ^ l and preside over the meetings of the Court of
iiials; and1
^jncarry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court
** the Judicial Council.
^Filing fees *°r * n e Court of Appeals are the same as for
.Supreme Court.
1988
i* Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
n S e Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all exrdmary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
2) Ike Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, includjuriadiction of interlocutory appeals; over:
(a) ftf*e final orders and decrees resulting from formal
judicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commislion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
Irust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and
« , (ii) a challenge to agency action under Section
* 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first
degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or
capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first
degree or capital felony;
ig) Appeals from the orders pn petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first
degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annula nt
^ » Property division, child custody, support, visitation,
Wpption, and paternity;
,4) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
»jAJ) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the
Supreme Court.
*ne Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by
JWctfour judges of the court may certify to the Supreme
•or original appellate review and determination any
^T^er which the Court of Appeals has original appellate
jt^fj? JP 0 . urt °f Appeals shall comply with the require»teits • 6 3 , C n a P t e r 4 6 D » Administrative Procedures
% *« J e v i e w °f agency adjudicative proceedings.
1996
S 5 L i t f f u i e W ° f a c t i o n s b y Supreme Court.
i 3 ^ 5 ^ e Judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of
S S c o T ** y P o t i o n for writ of certiorari to the

78-3-4

78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in Salt Lake
City. The Court of Appeals may perform any of its functions in
any location within the state.
1986
CHAPTER 3
DISTRICT COURTS
Section
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed.
78-3-3.
Term of judges — Vacancy.
78-3-4.
Jurisdiction — Appeals.
78-3-5.
Repealed.
78-3-6.
Terms — Minimum of once quarterly.
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed.
78-3-11.5.
State District Court Administrative System.
78-3-12.
Repealed.
78-3-12.5.
Costs of system.
78-3-13.
Repealed.
78-3-13.4.
Transfer of court operating responsibilities —
Facilities — Staff — Budget.
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed.
78-3-14.2.
District court case management.
78-3-14.5.
Allocation of district court fees and forfeitures.
78-3-15 to 78-3-17. Repealed.
Application of savings accruing to counties.
78-3-17.5.
78-3-18.
Judicial Administration Act — Short title.
Purpose of act.
*
78-3-19.
Definitions.
78-3-20.
Judicial Council — Creation — Members —
78-3-21.
Terms and election — Responsibilities —
Reports.
Data bases for judicial boards.
78-3-21.5.
Presiding officer — Compensation — Duties.
78-3-22.
Administrator of the courts — Appointment —
78-3-23.
Qualifications — Salary.
Court administrator — Powers, duties, and
78-3-24.
responsibilities.
Assistants for administrator of the courts —
78-3-25.
Appointment of trial court executives.
Courts to provide information and statistical
78-3-26.
data to administrator of the courts.
Annual judicial conference.
78-3-27.
Repealed.
78-3-28.
Presiding judge —Associate presiding judge —
78-3-29.
Election — Term — Compensation — Powers
— Duties.
78-3-30.
Duties of the clerk of the district court.
78-3-31.
Court commissioners — Qualifications — Appointment — Functions governed by rule.
78-3-1 to 78-3-2.

Repealed.

1971,1981, 1988

78-3-3. Term of j u d g e s — Vacancy.
Judges of the district courts shall be appointed initially
until the first general election held more than three years
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the
term of office for judges of the district courts is six years, and
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed
and qualified.
1988
78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Appeals.
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and
not prohibited by law.

78-12-7
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462

of the same, shall be effectual, unless it appears that the
person prosecuting the action, or interposing the defense or
counterclaim, or under whose title the action is prosecuted or
defense or counterclaim is made, or the ancestor, predecessor
or grantor of such person was seized or possessed of the
property in question within seven years before the committing
of the act in respect to which such action is prosecuted or
defense or counterclaim made.
1963

husbandry, or for pasturage or for the ordinary use of the
occupant.
(4) Where a known farm or single lot has been partly
improved, the portion of such farm or lot t h a t may have
been left not cleared or not inclosed according to the usual
course and custom of the adjoining county is deemed to
have been occupied for the same length of time as the part
improved and cultivated.
1963

78-12-7. Adverse possession — Possession presumed in
owner.
In every action for the recovery of real property, or the
possession thereof, the person establishing a legal title to the
property shall be presumed to have been possessed thereof
within the time required by law; and the occupation of the
property by any other person shall be deemed to have been
under and in subordination to the legal title, unless it appears
that the property has been held and possessed adversely to
such legal title for seven years before the commencement of
the action.
1953

78-12-10. U n d e r c l a i m n o t f o u n d e d o n w r i t t e n instru-

78-12-7.1. Adverse possession — Presumption — Proviso — Tax title.
In every action for the recovery or possession of real property or to quiet title to or determine the owner thereof the
person establishing a legal title to such property shall be
presumed to have been possessed thereof within the time
required by law; and the occupation of such property by any
other person shall be deemed to have been under and in
subordination to the legal title, unless it appears that such
property has been held and possessed adversely to such legal
title for seven years before the commencement of such action.
Provided, however, that if in any action any party shall
establish prima facie evidence that he is the owner of any real
property under a tax title held by him and his predecessors for
four years prior to the commencement of such action and one
year after the effective date of this amendment he shall be
presumed to be the owner of such property by adverse possession unless it appears that the owner of the legal title or his
predecessor has actually occupied or been in possession of
such property under such title or that such tax title owner and
his predecessors have failed to pay all the taxes levied or
assessed upon such property within such four-year period.
1963

78-12-8. Under written instrument or judgment*
Whenever it appears that the occupant, or those under
whom he claims, entered into possession of the property under
claim of title, exclusive of other right, founding such claim
upon a written instrument as being a conveyance of the
property in question, or upon the decree or judgment of a
competent court, and that there has been a continued occupation and possession of the property included in such instrument, decree or judgment, or of some part of the property
under such claim, for seven years, the property so included is
deemed to have been held adversely, except that when the
property so included consists of a tract divided into lots, the
possession of one lot is not deemed a possession of any other
lot of the same tract.
1963
78-12-9. What constitutes adverse possession under
written instrument.
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by
any person claiming a title founded upon a written instrument
or a judgment or decree, land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases:
(1) Where it has been usually cultivated or improved.
(2) Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure.
(3) Where, although not inclosed, it h a s been used for
the supply of fuel, or of fencing timber, for the purpose of

ment or judgment.
Where it appears t h a t there h a s been an actual continued
occupation of land under claim of title, exclusive of any other
right, but not founded upon a written instrument, judgment or
decree, the land so actually occupied, and no other, is deemed
to have been held adversely.
1963

78-12-11. What constitutes adverse possession not under written instrument.
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by a
person claiming title, not founded upon a written instrument,
judgment or decree, land is deemed to have been possessed
and occupied in the following cases only:
(1) Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure.
(2) Where it has been usually cultivated or improved.
(3) Where labor or money h a s been expended upon
dams, canals, embankments, aqueducts or otherwise for
the purpose of irrigating such lands amounting to the sum
of $5 per acre.
1963

78-12-12. Possession must be continuous, and taxes
paid.
In no case shall adverse possession be considered established under the provisions of any section of this code, unless
it shall be shown that the land has been occupied and claimed
for the period of seven years continuously, and that the party,
his predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes which have
been levied and assessed upon such land according to law.
1963

78-12-12.1. Possession and payment of taxes — Proviso
— Tax title.
In no case shall adverse possession be established under the
provisions of this code, unless it shall be shown t h a t the land
has been occupied and claimed for the period of seven years
continuously, and t h a t the party,' his predecessors and grantors have paid all the taxes which have been levied and
assessed upon such land according to law. Provided, however,
t h a t payment by the holder of a tax title to real property or his
predecessors, of all the taxes levied and assessed upon such
real property after the delinquent tax sale or transfer under
which he claims for a period of not less t h a n four years and for
not less t h a n one year after the effective date of this amendment, shall be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of this
section in regard to the payment of taxes necessary to establish adverse possession.
1963
78-12-13. A d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n of p u b l i c s t r e e t s o r w a y *
No person shall be allowed to acquire any right or title in or
to any lands held by any town, city or county, or the corporate
authorities thereof, designated for public use as streets, lanes,
avenues, alleys, parks or public squares, or for any other
public purpose, by adverse possession thereof for any length of
time whatsoever, unless it shall affirmatively appear t h a t such
town or city or county or the corporate authorities thereof have
sold, or otherwise disposed of, and conveyed such real estate to
a purchaser for a valuable consideration, and t h a t for more
t h a n seven years subsequent to such conveyance the pur*
chafer, his grantees or successors in interest, have been in the
exclusive, continuous and adverse possession of such real
estate; in which case an adverse title may be acquired.
l*53
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LOUISE A. DRAZICH, a/k/a LOUISE
ANN DRAZICH, as an individual, and
LOUISE A DRAZICH as Trustee of
Trusts created by the Will of
!
MARKO N. DRAZICH, deceased,
1
Plaintiff,
vs.

])

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

]

ALAN LASSON, an individual,
]
MARY D. WHITE, an individual,
DARRELL L. WHITE, an individual,
)
and DAVID A. WHITE, an individual '

Civil No. 940906967- PR
Judge: William B. Bohling

Defendants.

This case came on for trial to this Court, pursuant to notice,
on September 26, September 27, and November 13, 1996.

Plaintiff

and Defendant were represented by counsel and were given a full
opportunity to present their respective arguments on the issues
raised in the case.

Evidence, testimony and arguments of the

parties were presented and received for an in behalf of the
respective parties.

Based thereon, the Court being thus fully

advised in the premises, does hereby make and enter the following:

M62S1

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

Defendant Alan Lasson acquired title by Warranty Deed on

October 25, 1993, to a parcel of land (the "Lasson Property")
located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, described as follows:
Commencing 4.7 chains South and 19.62 chains West from the
East quarter corner, Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 1
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 3.08 chains;
thence South 45 deg. West 1.42 chains; thence North 4.15
chains; thence East 1.13 chains to the point of beginning.
2.

Plaintiff acquired title by Warranty Deed dated December,

1993, to a parcel of land which comprises approximately one (1)
acre (Exhibit 1-P) .
3.

The description contained

in the deed to Plaintiff

overlaps and extends into the Lasson Property to the extent of
approximately 11 feet at the easterly end and 20 feet at the
westerly end, for an average width of approximately 15 feet.

The

precise description of said conflict is not identified by metes and
bounds description.
4.

Title to the area in dispute has a common origin of title

by virtue of a Patent issued by the United States Government in
favor of James Bell, which appears of record in the official
records of Salt Lake County, Utah (Exhibit 15-P).
5.

The Patentee, James Bell, conveyed fee title to Abraham

Helm by a certain "Indenture" recorded in Book L, page 283-284, of
the official records of Salt Lake County, Utah (Exhibit 15-P).
6.

Abraham Helm, by a certain "Indenture" dated August 29,

1882, conveyed to The Denver and Rio Grande Railway Company (the
2
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"Railroad Company") an interest in a strip of land which extended
from the main line of the Railroad Company's railroad tracks, in a
northeasterly direction, over and across the lands owned by Helm.
The description contained in said Indenture describes the land to
which the interest related as being a corridor two (2) rods (33
feet) in width, lying 16 1/2 feet on either side of the center line
of an existing railroad track, which area includes the area in
dispute in the instant case.
7. The railroad tracks lying within the corridor were removed
in approximately 1904, and no precise legal description of the
location of the tracks or of the corridor in which the tracks were
located was ever recorded. Credible evidence at trial demonstrated
considerable discrepancy and confusion as to the exact location of
the Railroad Company tracks and that there may have been a shift in
the location of the tracks prior to the tracks being removed in
1904.
8.

The Railroad Company ceased paying taxes on the corridor

lands in 1904, ceased using the land for railroad purposes at that
time, and commenced quit claiming its interest in the corridor
lands as early as 1926.
9.

In 1958, the Railroad Company employed Coon and King

Engineers to attempt to survey the corridor of land upon which the
tracks had existed and to establish a legal description for the
corridor

which

had

been

imprecisely

Indenture.

3

described

in

the

1882

10.

The survey prepared by Coon and King Engineers revealed

the existence and location of a fence lying several feet south of
what Coon and King believed to be the northerly boundary of the
historic railroad right-of-way. No clear evidence was presented at
trial demonstrating that the Coon and King survey accurately
reflected the historic location of the Railroad Company tracks or
the corridor through which they travelled.

The location of the

fence and evidence of its long term existence evidences that the
fence may have been built along the northerly boundary of the
Railroad Company right-of-way.
11.

Based upon the Coon and King survey, on September 3,

1958, the Railroad Company issued a Special Warranty Deed to
Building Supply Center, which was recorded in the official records
of Salt Lake County, Utah, on November 26, 1958 (Exhibit 2-P).. The
legal

description

contained

in

the

Special

Warranty

Deed

incorporates the parcel of land which is in dispute in the case at
bar.
12.

The Special Warranty Deed contained exceptions and

conditions, one of which being the "...outstanding rights for any
and all...fences...now existing upon, under, along, over or across
the described premises."
13. The legal description contained in Plaintiff's deed dated
December, 1993, contained that portion of the land described in the
1958 Special Warranty Deed which is in dispute in the case at bar.
14.

The legal description contained in Defendant's Warranty

Deed dated October 25, 1993, also covers the entire area in
4
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dispute, and said legal description has been consistently and
continuously used in conveyances of the Lasson Property since at
least 1950.
15. Defendant and his predecessors in interest have used and
occupied the real property described in Defendant's Warranty Deed
since at least 1950.
16. Neither Plaintiff nor any of Plaintiff's predecessors in
interest have used or occupied any portion of the property in
dispute since at least 1950.

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes
and enters the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Defendant Alan Lasson is the owner of record in fee simple
of the lands and premises which are the subject of this dispute in
accordance with the legal description contained in the Warranty
Deed dated October 25, 1993, recorded October 26, 1993, as Entry
No. 5638344, in the official records of the Salt Lake County, Utah,
Recorder.
2 . Due to the imprecise legal description and other relevant
language contained in the 1882 Indenture between Abraham Helm and
the Railroad Company, the interest granted to the Railroad Company
in 1882 was a grant of a right-of-way only, subject to abandonment.
3.

Based upon its actions and inactions relative to its
5
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right-of-way, the Railroad Company abandoned its right-of-way at
some time prior to 1958.
4.

Based upon the abandonment and the conditional language

contained in the 1958 Special Warranty Deed from the Railroad
Company to Building Supply Center regarding warranty and fence
lines, no conveyance of the disputed

strip of land actually

occurred.
5.

No "title transaction," as that term is used in Section

57-9-2(4) of the Utah Marketable Record Title Act
Annotated,

Section

57-9-1 et, seq.) occurred

(Utah Code

so as to break

Defendant's chain of title which has existed in excess of the forty
(40) years required by Section 57-9-1 of the Utah Marketable Record
Title Act.
6.

Defendant Alan Lasson is entitled to a Decree awarding

said Defendant possession and right to possession of the premises
hereinafter described and is entitled to a Decree and Judgment
quieting title in said premises as against said Plaintiff and all
persons claiming by, through and under said Plaintiff, and said
Plaintiff should be enjoined, debarred and restrained from claiming
or asserting any right, title, interest or estate in and to the
premises belonging to Defendant, situate in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, and described as follows:
Commencing 4.7 chains South and 19.62 chains West from
the East quarter corner, Section 1, Township 2 South,
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South
3.08 chains; thence South 45 deg. West 1.42 chains; thence
North 4.15 chains; thence East 1.13 chains to the point
of beginning.
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7.

The counterclaim of Defendant for trespass is dismissed,

with prejudice.
8. Defendant is entitled to costs incurred. Each party shall
bear their own attorneyfs fees.

DATED this

2L.

day of

MAJ^iiJUl

., 1996

BY THp COURT /

WILLIAM B.

•x',..'^o\

BOtffciji^'^"^';

District Courfe->#u5qeV'^-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on this JS~ day of November, 1996, I
personally delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to:
Brant H. Wall, Esq.
Wall and Wall
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Suite 800, Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

DAVID P< MRS,
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DAVID P. HIRSCHI (1502)
Attorney at Law
?J U
2224 North 640 West
West Bountiful, Utah 84087
Telephone: (801) 296-1420
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Attorney for Defendant Alan Lasson

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LOUISE A. DRAZICH, a/k/a LOUISE
ANN DRAZICH, as an individual, and
LOUISE A DRAZICH as Trustee of
Trusts created by the Will of
MARKO N. DRAZICH, deceased,
Plaintiff,
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER
vs.
ALAN LASSON, an individual,
MARY D. WHITE, an individual,
DARRELL L. WHITE, an individual,
and DAVID A. WHITE, an individual

Civil No. 940906967. PR
Judge: William B. Bohling

Defendants.

The above entitled matter having come on for trial, pursuant
to notice, on September 26, September 27 and November 13, 1996,
before the Honorable Judge William B. Bohling, oral arguments
having been heard, evidence having been presented and Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law having been filed on November 26, 1996,
this Court now ORDERS AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Judgement in the above entitled matter is hereby granted

to Defendant Alan Lasson.
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2.

Defendant Alan Lasson is granted full possession of and

quiet title to all of the following described real property (the
"Subject Property") located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to
wit :
Commencing 4.7 chains South and 19.62 chains West from the
East quarter corner, Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 1
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 3.08 chains;
thence South 45 deg. West 1.42 chains; thence North 4.15
chains; thence East 1.13 chains to the point of beginning,
all as shown on the Survey of Record recorded as Recordation
No. 96-110466 in the official records of the Salt Lake County
Surveyor.
3. Plaintiff is hereby enjoined, debarred and restrained from
claiming or asserting any right, title, interest or estate in and
to the Subject Property.
4.

Plaintiff shall reimburse Defendant Alan Lasson for all

costs incurred in defending this action (excluding attorney's fees)
upon submission of written evidence of said costs to Plaintiff
and/or Plaintiff's counsel of record.
5.

Defendant Alan Lasson1s counterclaim for trespass is

dismissed, with prejudice.
6.

Each party shall bearatheir own attorneyfs fees.

DATED THIS

O

day of

WILLIAM B. BOHLING S
District Courts Jud^ce^"
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NOTICE TO COUNSEL
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, David P.
Hirschi, attorney for Defendant Alan Lasson, will submit the
foregoing JUDGMENT AND ORDER to the Honorable Judge Bohling for his
signature, pursuant to Rule 206 of the Rules of Practice of the
District Courts of the State of Utah, upon the expiration of eight
days of the date of mailing this notice to you, unless you file
objection thereto in writing. Kindly govern yourself accordingly.
DATED this 16th day of December, 1996.

David P/ Hirschi
Attorney for Defendant Lasson

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that on this 16th day of December, 1996, I
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing by U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid, to:
Brant H. Wall, Esq.
Wall and Wall
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Suite 800, Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

David P.

L\Lass.j&o

006241

